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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the re-examination of the requisites of due process [as found in Interna-
tional Shoe Company v. Washington].'
Case law in Montana is still at the stage prior to the International
Shoe case.' If the rather orthodox decision in LeVecke v. Griesedieck West-
ern Brewing Company is used as persuasive authority in the Montana
courts, adoption of the progressive and preferable "minimum contacts" test
will be unfortunately postponed.
WARD A. SHANAHAN
CRIMINAL LAW-INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-UNLAWFUL ACT As BASIS
FOR CONVICTION.-Appeliant, while driving on the wrong side of the high-
way, collided with an oncoming gasoline truck and caused the death of the
driver. She was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based upon both
criminal negligence in driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and upon the unlawful act of driving to the left of the center line.1
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded for
a new trial. An instruction authorizing a manslaughter conviction for the
unlawful act of driving on the wrong side of the road is erroneous because
criminal negligence is an essential element of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter. State v. Strobel, 304 P.2d 606 (Mont. 1956) (Chief Justice Adair
and Justice Bottomley dissenting).
Bracton's thirteenth century writings stated that criminal liability at-
tached for homicide committed by misadventure in the course of an un-
lawful act.' Coke recognized that homicide in the course of an unlawful
act was necessarily either voluntary or involuntary, but stated both were
punishable alike as murder.' Hale subsequently recognized a definite dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and in his time
DPerkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ; Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
2"ontana case law is also limited to a few decisions on the subject. The theories of
"implied consent" and "constructive presence" appear in the companion cases State
em rel. Am. Laundry Machinery Co. v. District Court, 98 Mont. 278, 41 P.2d 26
(1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744 (1935), and State eo rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v.
District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 75 P.2d 772 (1936). In the first case summons was
quashed where it appeared that the corporation's dealings were limited to several
isolated transactions. The corporation also was not shown to have appointed an
agent for the purpose of service of process. The second case was tried on findings
of new facts that the corporation had actually been engaged in continuous activity.
The sale of goods, replacement of worn out parts, and adjustments and repairs to
machinery enabled the court to infer that it was "present." By the time of the
second suit the corporation had a regular agent upon whom process could be served
in accord with R.C.M. 1921, § 9111(2).
The most recent Montana decision is State ex rel. Schmidt v. District Court, 111
Mont. 16, 105 P.2d 611 (1940). The corporation involved there had previously com-
plied with the statutory requirement for appointment of an agent upon whom pro-
cess could be served but failed to appoint a replacement when the original man died.
This case adhered to the theory of "implied consent" and certainly did, not require
a broad rule in view of the corporation's long business contact with the state.
The most recent decision involving a Montana party and a foreign corporation is
Clapper Motor Co. v. Robinson Motor Co., 119 F. Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1954). The
court there relied on the older theory of "constructive presence."
1Rzvrsm) CoDzs OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 31-108 (19), 32-1102, and 32-1104, statutes then
in force.
2 BRA ToN, DE Lumrus, 120b, 136b (1569) (written 1250's).
COKE, 3d INSTITUTE No. 56 (1641).
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RECENT DECISIONS
the punishment for the latter was moderated.' Blackstone stated the modern
rule that involuntary manslaughter could be predicated on either an unlaw-
ful act or on negligence, and the language of the present Montana statute
can be traced to his discussion.' Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section
94-2507, defines manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice. It is of two kinds: . . . 2. Involuntary, in the commission
of an unlawful act not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a law-
ful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution or circumspection."
A strong majority of the courts hold that a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter may be based on either an unlawful act not amounting to
felony or on negligence (usually described as gross or criminal negligence).'
Only a few jurisdictions concur with the rule of the instant case in requir-
ing criminal negligence in every instance.' Although the older Montana
cases have based an involuntary manslaughter conviction squarely on the
ground of negligence,' the more recent decisions have typically used an un-
lawful act and criminal negligence as conjunctive grounds for conviction,
without attempting to analyze the statute carefully.! There have been two
clarifying exceptions: (1) In quoting the statute in one case, the court
italicized the "or" following the semicolon between the unlawful act clause
and the negligent lawful act clause, indicating recognition of them as inde-
pendent alternative grounds.' (2) In a later case the court held that not
every unlawful act could be the basis for an involuntary manslaughter con-
viction.'
In the instant case the Montana Supreme Court concluded the evidence
showed the defendant was not intoxicated, but the reversal was based mainly
'HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROwN 466, 471 (ed. of 1778).
5
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *191, 192.
°State of Maryland v. Chapman, 101 F. Supp. 335 (D. Md. 1951) ; Champion v. State,
35 Ala. App. 7, 44 So. 2d 616 (1949) ; Wiley v. State, 19 Ariz. 346, 170 Pac. 869, 1918D
L.R.A. 373 (1918) ; Comer v. State, 212 Ark. 66, 204 S.W.2d 875 (1947) ; People v.
Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926, 930, 931 (1955) ; State v. Arnold, 3 Terry 47, 27
A.2d 81 (Del. Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1942) ; Perry v. State, 78 Ga. App. 273, 50 S.E.2d 709
(1948) ; State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258 (1951) ; People v. Garman, 411
Ill. 279, 103 N.E.2d 636 (1952) ; Minardo v. State, 204 Ind. 422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932) ;
State v. Champ, 172 Kan. 737, 242 P.2d 1070 (1952) ; Commonwealth v. Mullins, 296
Ky. 190, 176 S.W.2d 403 (1943); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218, 100 A.2d 234
(1953) ; People v. Wardell, 291 Mich. 276, 289 N.W. 328 (1939) ; People v. Nelson,
309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d 391 (1955) ; State v. Bournais, 240 N.C. 311, 82 S.E.2d 115
(1954) ; Williams v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 229, 263 P2d 527, 532 (1953) ; State v.
Nodine, 198 Ore. 679, 259 P.2d 1056 (1953) ; Commonwealth v. Russin, 171 Pa. Super.
268, 90 A.2d 395 (1952) ; Valentine v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 946, 48 S.E.2d 264
(1948) ; State v. Wilson, 301 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1956) ; State v. Boston, 233 Iowa
1249, 11 N.W.2d 407, 410 (1943) (dictum) ; State v. Sill, 47 Wash. 2d 647# 289 P.2d
720, 723 (1955) (dictum) ; State v. Bail, 88 S.E.2d 634, 648 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App.
1955) (dictum). New Jersey and Ohio apparently base involuntary manslaughter
convictions solely on unlawful acts. State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161, 163
(1956) (dictum) ; State v. Laswell, 66 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (dic-
tum).
'State v. Peterson, 116 Utah 362, 210 P.2d 229 (1950). FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1949)
makes negligence the sole basis for involuntary manslaughter. Miller v. State, 75
So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1954). Cf. State v. Bolle, 201 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1947).
*State v. Allison, 122 Mont. 120, 199 P.2d 279 (1948) ; State v. Kuum, 55 Mont. 436,
178 Pac. 288 (1919) ; Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888).
'State v. Messerly, 126 Mont. 62, 244 P.2d 1054 (1952) ; State v. Souhrada, 122 Mont.
377, 204 P.2d 792 (1949) ; State v. Darchuck, 117 Mont. 15, 156 P.2d 173 (1945).
"'State v. Powell, 114 Mont. 571, 138 P.2d 949 (1943) (by implication).
nState v. Bosch, 125 Mont. 566, 576,, 242 P.2d 477 (1952).
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on the erroneous instruction. The court incorrectly stated that the rule re-
quiring criminal negligence in all cases of involuntary manslaughter had
been previously declared in Montana. This case originates the rule requir-
ing criminal negligence in every case. The court also cited the recent Cali-
fornia case of People v. Penny' in support of the rule, yet that case specifi-
cally recognizes that a manslaughter conviction can be based on an unlaw-
ful act aside from negligence. The instant decision defined criminal negli-
gence as an act done with disregard for human life, indifference to con-
sequences, recklessness, or marked disregard for the safety of others.
The Montana Court bases the new rule on the proposition that involun-
tary manslaughter requires mens rea, and that only intent or criminal negi-
gence can satisfy that requirement. It is evident that specific intent cannot
be an element of involuntary manslaughter, because it is by definition an
unintentional crime. An eminent writer, however, has recognized that mens
rea is a mental state, the specific elements of which vary with the definitions
of the various crimes. He indicates that the mens rea may be the intent to
do the deed which constitutes the actus reus of the crime involved, or some
other mental element recognized by law as a substitute for intent in that
particular crime.' It is submitted that in the case of involuntary man-
slaughter, criminal negligence is not the only mental element which can be
substituted for intent as a form of mens rea.
If an involuntary homicide is non-negligent, the only actual intent
which can be involved is the intent to commit the unlawful act which re-
sulted in the death. If mens rea is to be required at all in such cases, the
requirement can be fulfilled in either of two ways: (1) by reasoning that
the intent to commit the unlawful act which caused the homicide is trans-
ferred to the homicide itself," or (2) by requiring only a general mens rea,
in which case the generally bad or "man-endangering" state of mind present
in the commission of the basic unlawful act is sufficient to make the actor
chargeable with all proximate results.' One writer argues that either of
the above alternatives is at least partially fiction; that no mens rea is re-
quired under either the felony-murder or the misdemeanor-manslaughter
doctrines, because both punish for a wholly unintended and often unforsee-
able result, solely on the basis of the actus reus."
The next question is, What unlawful acts merit punishment as man-
slaughter if unintended death results? Except during the very early com-
mon law period of absolute criminal liability, the involuntary homicide has
not usually been criminally punished unless the basic unlawful act was par-
ticularly blameworthy." Historically, only acts malum in se-wrong in them-
selves-were so punished. Now the malum in se-malum prohibitum distinc-
tion has become so amorphous and indistinct as to be useless as a delineator,
1"44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926, 930, 931 (1955).
"'Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HAxv. L. Rgv. 905, 908, 909 (1939). See also
BuRDICK, CIUaME § 129e (1946).
"King v. State, 89 Ga. App. 626, 80 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1954); 26 Aii. JurL, Homioide
§ 188 (1940).
'"CI. People v. Barrett, 261 Ill. 232, 103 N.E. 969, 971 (1913); State v. Woodward, 84
Iowa 172, 50 N.W. 885 (1891).
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though it is still followed by many courts.' Courts which have abandoned
the practice of basing involuntary manslaughter convictions on unlawful
acts have done so precisely because of the lack of an adequate criterion. But
the fundamental reasons for making an unlawful act an alternative basis
for conviction-the moral reprehehensibility of certain unlawful acts, and
the loss to society caused by deprivation of members as a result of such actse
-still exist and are as forceful as ever.
A new test is needed to determine what homicides resulting from un-
lawful acts should be punished as manslaughter. It is obvious that no
panacea can be discovered, but a workable test can be based on a determina-
tion of whether the act involves moral turpitude. Most involuntary homi-
cides undoubtedly do involve negligence, and in such cases the rule of the
principal case will suffice. But there is a class of cases, involving moral
turpitude, in which the death may unintentionally result from a completely
reprehensible unlawful act, and yet no negligence be involved.
Suppose, for example, that a nurse becomes a "pusher" of naroctics,
and illegally administers morphine to an adult addict. The injection is
given with the greatest of skill, but the addict has previously had an over-
dose and this injection is sufficient to cause death from morphine poisoning.
If the nurse has no knowledge of the victim's prior overdose, and the quanti-
ty of the drug injected is normal for an addict, no negligence is involved.'
Yet if she has no prior narcotic convictions, the death is an involuntary
homicide, resulting from an unlawful act not amounting to a felony.' Under
previous Montana decisions the nurse could be found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. Under the rule of the instant case she would go free. In a
similar Georgia case a manslaughter conviction was sustained.'
The new test for criminal negligence stated in the principal case also
presents some difficulty. When criminal negligence is defined in terms of
disregard for human life, indifference to consequences, and recklessness, the
line between involuntary manslaughter based on criminal negligence, and
second degree murder based on implied malice tends to become shadowy and
indistinct.' Malice may be implied from an act or omission which the actor
knows may cause death or gross bodily harm, even if accompanied by a hope
against harm."
The rule enunciated in the instant case has two undesirable effects.
First, and most important, it emasculates the code definition of involuntary
manslaughter so as to preclude basing a conviction on an unlawful act if the
homicide is not negligent. This will either prevent manslaughter convictions
1
OCL&RX & MARsHATL, CRImES 13 (5th ed. 1952) ; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUm. L. REV. 55, 70, 71 (1953).
"Wilner, Unintentional Homocide in the Commi~sion of an Unlawful Act, 87 U. PA.
L. REv. 811, 815, 816 (1939).
2'Negligence is the breach of a duty toward another, and "the risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed .... " Cardozo, C.J., in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"RmsE CoDwE OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 54-102, 54-118, 54-125.
2eState v. Silver, 13 Ga. App. 722, 79 S.E. 919 (1913).
'A very similar test for criminal negligence was stated in the case of People v. Penny,
44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 (1955), a case relied on in the instant decision. That
definition has likewise been criticized as blurring the distinction between Involun-
tary manslaughter and second degree murder. 8 STAN. L. REv. 463 (1956).
"People v. Copley, 32 Cal. App. 2d 74, 89 P.2d 160 (1939) ; STEPHEn, DIGEST OF CRIM-
INAL LAW 225, 226 (1926).
1957]
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in some cases which would seem to merit such punishment, or will force the
courts to overextend the definition of negligence in order to include such
cases within the rule. Second, unless the courts are very careful to define
implied malice so as to require wilfulness as distinguished from negligence,
and actual knowledge of probable injury as distinguished from constructive
knowledge of likely harm, the line between involuntary manslaughter and
second degree murder based on implied malice will become confused.
CHARLES W. WILLEY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- INDICTMENT AD !INFORMATION- SUFFICIENCY OF
CHARGING OFFENSE IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE.-The defendant, a
county surveyor, made a claim to and received from Missoula county $600
for work on the county airport. The claim was made in the name of a
fictitious company and the defendant signed a name other than his own, as
secretary, of such company. He was convicted of obtaining money by false
pretenses. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, reversed. An
information alleging presentation of a "false and fraudulent claim," with-
out specifying facts showing some material representation is insufficient.
State v. Hale, 291 P.2d 229 (Mont. 1955) (Justice Angstman specially con-
curring; Chief Justice Adair and Justice Bottomly dissenting separately).
During the early years of the common law crimes were punishable with
the greatest severity, because a private party was the prosecutor and the
moving influence was revenge. Gradually the public reaction against the
increasing number of executions for relatively petty offenses influenced the
courts to construe criminal indictments and informations more strictly.1
Thereafter it became necessary to state the offense charged with great par-
ticularity. Technicalities were of the utmost importance and as a result the
criminal was often released.!
When the harshness of criminal penalties was ameliorated, the reason
for the highly technical rulings on criminal pleading was gone and con-
sequently the legislatures substituted new systems of pleading and practice
which contained the necessary elements of the common law system but did
away with the superfluous technicalities.!
By the Constitutions of the United States' and Montana' the accused is
entitled to be apprised of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him. This is accomplished by the use of an indictment or information which
must, under both common and statutory law, serve three general purposes:
(1) inform the accused of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare for his trial, (2) protect the accused from double jeopardy, and
(3) enable the court to rule on evidence and upon conviction to pronounce
just sentence.' An information that does not embody these requirements is
insufficient and a conviction is subject to reversal.'
PuTrKAMMER, ADMINISTIR&TrON OF CRIMINAL LAw 125-130 (1953).
2See State v. Gondeiro, 82 Mont. 530, 268 Pac. 507 (1928).8
0RFELD, CRIMINAL PaOCEDuRE 200 (1947).
4U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16.
'State v. Cox, 244 N.C. 57, 92 S.E.2d 413 (1956).
'Id. at 60, 92 S.E.2d at 416,
[Vol. is,
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